FOREWORD TO THE SCOPE OF THE LABOR
EXEMPTION IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS:
A PERSPECTIVE ON COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE NFL
ED GARVEY*

The article by Professor Ethan Lock that I have been asked to introduce explains in detail the history of the long struggle between the National Football League Players' Association (NFLPA) and National
Football League (NFL) owners in the courts and before the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The article also indicates how the labor-management problems that have separated the two sides can be resolved. These problems can be cured if both sides: clearly recognize the
realities of the caselaw established in the 1970s, examine carefully their
own self-interest, and give at least a casual glance to the public's interest
in finding a workable relationship. However, absent such a realistic assessment the battle will likely rage into the next decade.
To understand the current dispute in the NFL, Professor Lock provides a useful legal background, highlighting the history of player restraints in the NFL and the unique nature of collective bargaining in the
context of the football industry.1 Professor Lock then suggests solutions
which stem from both our public policy toward labor-management conflicts, as embodied in the labor laws, and the public interest inherent in
those conflicts. 2 However, in order to appreciate and understand the
current dispute, one must grasp more than labor law principles and a
vague sense of the public interest. Therefore, in the next several pages I
will describe the third side of the framework-the perspective of the various interested parties in the dispute.
Bargaining in the NFL over a new collective agreement ceased
months ago. In November 1988, the NFL, through its bargaining arm,
the NFL Management Council (NFLMC), announced that the League
would implement a new "free agent" system on its own if the NFLPA
refused to choose between two options drafted by the owners and their
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1. See Lock, The Scope of the LaborExemption in ProfessionalSports, 1989 DuKE L.J. 339,
343-78.
2. See id., at 395-415.
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attorneys. 3 The union proposed a middle ground along the lines of the
National Basketball Association and Major League Baseball solutions in
which players have freedom to move but overall limits are placed on
clubs. In response, management refused to compromise and instead announced in February, 1989, that it would implement its own version of a
new reserve system tying players to their teams. 4 The union opted to
reject management's options, and instead will rely on an antitrust case
pending in Minnesota district court 5 to gain in court what they had little
chance to achieve in collective bargaining-complete free agency for veteran NFL players. In the meantime, the complex NLRB case arising out
of the NFL's alleged illegal activity during the 1987 negotiations, strike,
and scab games moves along with glacial speed. 6 At this juncture it seem
likely that the "greenhouse" effect will melt the polar ice caps before the
NLRB disposes of the case.
With bargaining at an impasse, the players' union finds itself in a
difficult position. The prevailing wisdom among players' agents is that
NFL superstars will be better off if they can stop a collective bargaining
agreement, or even a court settlement of the antitrust case, because implicit in a labor agreement or a settlement is the word "compromise."
Compromise is required not just between management and labor, but
also among members of the union. Under a negotiated settlement, the
stars would have to take less so the defensive backs, punters, and linemen
can get a little more.
The agents assume that a finite pot of money is available each year
for players' salaries, and if the stars get more, the rest get less. Under
this scenario, the stars have individual bargaining power, but the nonstars must depend on collective bargaining for most of their salary and
benefits. While current NFLPA leaders discredit that approach because
it has been proven wrong in baseball, it has credibility in the sports press
and among agents because NFL management repeats it all the time: "If
the stars have unlimited freedom of movement, there will be no money
left for the non-stars."
If the agents who represent superstars succeed in decertifying the
union, as some are attempting to do, it should be clear that without a
union the agents would never reach an agreement with the NFL. One
reason is that they are confident that NFL owners will never agree voluntarily, in a collective bargaining agreement, to free agency-and they
may be right. With no agreement, the agents would operate in their ideal
3. See id. at 347.

4. See id.
5. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988).
6. NLRB Memorandum Case No. 2-CB-12117.
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situation of negotiating everything: salary, pension, insurance, and postseason pay. Today, agents negotiate only regular season pay; the union
takes care of the rest.7 Curiously, the management people who support
the decertification effort have not figured out a game plan yet. They operate on the philosophy, "If my enemy is unhappy, I am happy." And, it
is clear that the decertification effort, while not a serious threat, is a time
consuming annoyance that distracts and unsettles the NFLPA
leadership.
Given the ease with which the NFL crushed the union's 1987
strike,8 an obvious mismatch at the bargaining table exists. In such a
mismatch, I do not believe that there can be "arm's-length, good faith
collective bargaining." 9 Future courts must look behind any agreement
to determine whether there really was bargaining, or whether the NFL
monopoly forced an agreement on a weak union. 10 Never again can
there be an assumption of roughly equal strength when reviewing player
restraints in the NFL.
Frankly, an agreement in the next two or three years is unlikely. If
the union could shut down the Super Bowl or the playoff games, the
parties would reach an agreement immediately. Everyone knows that,
and everyone also knows that the union lacks such power. Unless the
union can apply economic pressure on management, management will
not engage in meaningful arm's-length bargaining.
In fact, bargaining as such may be dead in the NFL. My reasons for
despair can best be illustrated by presenting the hypothetical views, in
their own words (more or less), of the various participants in this gamethe owners, the union, and players' agents. I choose this approach because it is the attitudes of these participants that lead to law suits, NLRB
complaints, strikes, congressional hearings, elaborate preparations for labor war with no effort to achieve labor peace, scab games, and law review
articles. Let us begin this examination with a hypothetical look at management's side through the eyes of a hard-line advisor.
This management advisor would tell the NFL owners that an agreement is unlikely for several reasons. The archetypal management advisor
7. The 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League Management Council and the National Football League Players' Association covers, inter alia, meal
allowances, id. art. XXV; moving and travel expenses, id. art. XXVII; group insurance, id. art.
XXX; and a retirement plan, id. art. XXXIV.
8. See Lock, supra note I, at 367.
9. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976) (labor exemption applicable only
where the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide, arm's-length bargaining),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
10. For a discussion of the inequality of bargaining power in NFL-NFLPA negotiations, see
Lock, supra note 1, at 354-59.
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would make the following argument: "First, there is no reason for management to want an agreement with the union. We are doing just fine.
Money is pouring in, our hidden wage scale with its consistent level of
salary increases continues to hold expenses in line, 1 and we are about to
stop paying the bills for the pension, insurance, and severance pay benefits just as we prepare for our first significant cable television package
deal. When we cut out all collective benefits, we will have wiped out
twenty years of union progress, and we will be back where we started in
1970 after the AFL-NFL merger-no collective benefits and no free
agency. The union will have to scratch and claw its way back to where it
was in 1987." He would add: "The agents are keeping the union off
balance, the reserve system is in place, the NLRB will never do anything,
and the courts are so slow and judges so timid when sports are involved
that it will be business as usual for the foreseeable future."
Our management advisor would continue: "Second, even if for
some reason you wanted an agreement, the union is in no position to
extract sufficient concessions from you to convince its members to agree.
You have them right where you want them. You have successfully convinced a majority of players that the NFL is so powerful that the players
cannot strike. The horrendous 'replacement' games were covered by the
networks, and some announcers even started babbling that the scabs
were almost as good as the regulars! I don't know how you forced the
networks to cover the worst football ever aired, but it worked. People
watched, advertisers paid, and the strike collapsed. The players know
they cannot strike effectively."
This hard-line advisor then would make his final point: "Third, the
group seeking decertification of the NFLPA is destabilizing the situation
just enough so that the union leadership can't spend all its efforts building strength for a fight with us-they must fight the new group. If they
compromise on free agency, the agents will argue that the union leadership 'sold out' the membership. In fact, if they get anything less than a
perfect agreement, the leaders will be thrown to the proverbial dogs by
agents, sports writers, and stars. And, let's face it, you have no need to
ever agree to their idea of a 'good deal,' let alone a great deal. The essence of an agreement in labor is compromise, and since free agency is
the only issue on the table in the minds of the players and the public,
compromise is impossible. Either you are free or you aren't. Anything
less than complete freedom will be regarded by the players as a loss because it will be played in the media as the only important issue. 12 My
11. See NFLPA, STAT SHEET (Winter 1988-89) (consistent pattern of increases in average
NFL salary).
12. See, ag., Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 13, 1989, at 7-8.
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conclusion is that you will not get an agreement in the next year and
maybe you will never have an agreement with the NFLPA again, so
relax."
An equally astute advisor on the union side would tell the Board of
Player Representatives, the governing body of the union, that a number
of factors will prevent the parties from reaching an agreement. The
union advisor will tell his story thus: "First, the owners are not unified
enough to accept free agency in a collective bargaining agreement because they are afraid that one or two owners might actually bid on free
agents and thus expose the quiet conspiracy that has been part of the
NFL since the 1920s. The quiet conspiracy works so long as there is a
public excuse not to bid for players. For a while it was the Rozelle Rule;
now it is the right of first refusal/compensation system. 13
"Prior to the Mackey v.NFL case settlement in 1976,14 teams said
they would not sign veteran free agents because they feared the compensation to be set by Commissioner Rozelle might be another veteran
player; they suggested that if it were only a draft choice or two, they
would be happy to sign a first-rate, proven veteran.15 Then in 1977 the
union and the owners reached a settlement that was supposed to bring
about significant bidding for free agents because it eliminated the worst
aspects of the old Rozelle Rule. Under the 1977 plan, no veterans could
be used as compensation, the Commissioner would be removed from the
system, and the compensation would be established in advance to remove
the fear of the unknown. 16 But as soon as the ink was dry, team owners
refused to sign proven veteran free agents. There was no movement of
players and no bidding for their services despite all the promises in bargaining and to the court.17 One excuse was that the owners now feared
the 'known' use of draft choices as compensation for veteran free agents.
The fact is, they have used available excuses for sixty-eight years. Court
decisions, strikes, and NLRB rulings aside, the owners have never bid for
18
free agents in the NFL."
The union advisor would add: "Besides, we all know that complete
free agency may not work even for the stars because there is no economic
incentive, given the corporate socialism of the NFL owners, for a team to
13. For a discussion of the history of various forms of player restraints, see Lock, supra note 1,
at 346-47.
14. See id. at 379-81 (discussion of Mackey).
15. For a discussion of the Rozelle rule and its impact on player movement, see id. at 348.
16. See id. at 359-61.
17. See id.
18. For a discussion of the history of restraints on player movements, see id. at 346-47.
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spend the necessary money to sign a free agent.19 But if all the excuses
were eliminated, and still no free agents were signed, the conspiracy
would be so obvious that litigation would surely follow. Losing owners
would have no excuse not to sign a star free agent. The fans would begin
to catch on to the real game of football played by the owners. Now
clearly most objective observers would say that twenty-eight owners, operating within a monopoly where most revenues are shared equally,
would never bid against one another-but stranger things have happened. With new owners coming into the League, one or two might
break the unwritten rule and try to buy enough talent to win. Either
way, free agency poses some risk for the owners."
The union advisor would continue: "Second, the owners have put in
place a mechanism in the NFL constitution and by-laws to protect the
hardliners against owners who want labor peace. The hardliners need
but seven votes to block any agreement with the union. 20 When the National Labor Relations Act was passed, Congress never contemplated an
unregulated monopoly with a built-in minority control mechanism negotiating with a union. While the NLRB has ruled that extraordinary majorities in multi-employer bargaining units are acceptable and legal, 21 the
NFL presents a special case. In the normal multi-employer bargaining
unit, each member can withdraw from the unit before bargaining with
the union commences. Unilateral withdrawal is unavailable in the NFL,
however, as it takes a constitutional amendment to allow a team to withdraw from the multi-employer unit and negotiate individually. 2 2 Once
again, seven owners could stop either from happening. As a result, the
NFL cannot be treated like any other employer. The 'tyranny of the
minority' among NFL owners will prevent any agreement in the NFL
until Congress takes a look at the monopolistic monster it created (by
giving the NFL two statutory exemptions from the antitrust laws 23), or
until the courts rule that the nonstatutory labor exemption is inapplicable if a minority controls the management side."
19. Corporate socialism results from the NFL's broadcasting revenue sharing plan in which all
teams receive a pro rata share of the networks' payment, which represents by far the largest source of
NFL revenues. See id. at 405 (discussion of pro rata plan and resulting lack of intra-league
competition).
20. NFL Const. and By-Laws.
21. Cf In re Shipowners' Ass'n, 7 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1938) (multi-employer association, acting on
behalf of individual employers for collective bargaining, was within definition of "employer" under
the Wagner Act and its employees constituted appropriate unit).
22. NFL Const.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982); See Lock, supra note 1, at 402-16 (discussing NFL's statutory
exemptions).
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Finally, our advisor might say: "We have only three possibilities: 1)
we must win the antitrust case and get free agency for all players; 2)
Congress must reexamine the statutory antitrust exemptions; or 3) another league must start to give players a choice. 24 When there is competition between leagues, the NFL will quickly settle differences with the
players in order to get on with the all important task of maintaining monopoly status."
The agent advisor, speaking to those involved in the union decertification effort, explains that perspective. He begins: "We must stop a collective bargaining agreement at all costs. Threaten decertification to
keep the NFLPA off balance, tell your people not to pay dues and blame
the union leadership for management's power in breaking the strike in
1987.25 And, if they try to settle the Powell case,2 6 we will be there in
force to object to any settlement that restricts, in any way, movement of
veteran free agents. Furthermore, we must stop any agreement between
the union and the NFL that would allow the common draft of rookies to
continue. If we can abolish the draft, that will mean more money for our
players so salaries will go up dramatically without an agreement. Remember, the more division among the players, the less consensus exists
for an agreement."
These differing viewpoints illustrate just how far apart the parties
are in this dispute. As I see it, in order to reach a workable level of
understanding and labor peace, each of the parties needs to confront the
following realities:
1. The League needs an agreement with a strong union to operate effectively without crippling lawsuits and without domination of the
game by a few agents representing a handful of superstars.
2. Without the athletes there is no football industry. They are the reason why people watch the game, and there is no point in continuing
efforts to beat them. The NBA and its union work together, with the
players benefiting from a minimum of 53% of gross revenues, free
agency, and stability.27 The NBA plan is based on the 1982 NFLPA
negotiating position, and it works. The NFL needs a labor-management partnership along those same lines.
3. The only justification for the draft, standard player contract, option
clause, and reserve system is that a strong union accepted those restrictions as a compromise to achieve the greater good for the greatest
number of players. If any restrictions are forced upon a weakened
24. For a discussion of measures which can be taken to right the current imbalance in the NFL,
see id. at 395-419.
25. See id. at 367.
26. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988).
27. See Lock, supra note 1, at 341 & n.15.
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union, those restrictions are bound to eventually fail the Mackey test.28
The NFLPA engages in collective bargaining, not individual bargaining. The test of its duty of fair representation is how well all players do
under an agreement,
not just whether a few at the top of the salary
29
range do well.
4. For management to attempt to justify restrictions on bidding for
veteran athletes within a monopoly on the grounds that it saves the
monopoly money, or that free agency will "destroy the NFL as we
know it today," is absurd on its face. Every court looking at those
arguments has said so, 30 and every court in the future will follow that
reasoning. The sooner the owners face that fact, the sooner there will
be peace.
5. The focus of the current dispute is, as usual, too narrow. A collective bargaining agreement provides, inter alia, for pensions, severance
pay, an effective grievance system to settle disputes, benefits to injured
players and widows' benefits, and guaranteed contracts-much more
than just free agency. But many of the sports columnists seem incapable of focusing on a variety of issues, so they focus exclusively on "free
agency."
In my view, the emphasis is all wrong. In 1974, the union went
out on strike over the "freedom" issues, i.e., the union wanted to end
the reserve system. In the process it found out how powerful and obstinate the NFL can be. But in 1974, I can tell you that the union's
emphasis was on freedom and dignity for all players, not more money
for the stars. Somehow, though, the press focused only on money
rather than dignity. The goal was a stronger union of free men who
could gain more collective benefits, not secure millions for a handful of
superstars, but the press and the public missed all that.
On the free agency issue, the NFL has split the players into haves
and have-nots. They obfuscated the human issues by emphasizing the
economic issues. It was simply divide and conquer. The original
message to the linemen was: "Are you really on strike so quarterbacks
can get more money? I thought you were smarter than that, son. We
won't bid for you. We will bid for the quarterbacks, and when we do,
there won't be any money left in the pot for you. It's none of my
business because its your union, but if I were you, I'd get my fanny into
camp before that good-looking rookie beats you out of your job."
Today, the NFL is sending a different message to that lineman:
"You must choose between collective benefits, including the pension,
and free agency. Unless you give up your demand for freedom at the
table, we will punish you by eliminating all collective benefits." But
circumstances today are much different than they were in 1974 or even
in 1982. In 1974, the average salary was $33,000, and by 1982 it had
28. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615-16, (8th Cir. 1976) (labor exemption does not apply
to Rozelle Rule where no bona fide arm's-length bargaining took place), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801
(1977).
29. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 381, 695-98 (1976).
30. See Lock supra note 1, at 359 & n. 114 (discussing player restraint cases).
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only risen to $102,500.31 Even in 1982, fringe benefits were extremely
important as a percentage of the players' economic package. Today,
with the average salary at nearly $250,000, fringe benefits, although
high by most standards, make up less than 25% of the players' economic package. 32 In my view, the threat to "cave in or lose your benefits" will work because salaries are so high and benefits hold less
significance.
Management had a lot more difficulty dividing the players in 1982
than in 1974 because in 1982 the union went for money for all players.
The goal was not money that might result from an untested theory of
free agency and "trickle down" economics, but actual dollars for severance pay, insurance, pensions, and a wage scale. In 1974, the NFL
broke the strike with raw power, some illegal actions, and superior
resources. 33 Management said they were fighting the union to protect
the reserve system. In 1982, eight games were cancelled and the season was one week from cancellation because the players were united as
never before over collective money issues at a time when individual
negotiations had not resulted in high wages. All that is changed today.
6. The NFL owners will keep the focus on their refusal to agree to
complete free agency in order to keep the focus off the real money
issues. And the sports media will judge every offer by comparing it to
free agency in basketball and baseball, not by comparing the more significant statistic of the percentage of gross revenues going to athletes in
the various leagues. Prior to the 1982 collective bargaining agreement,
players were receiving roughly 30% of gross revenues. Today the
would
NFL estimates that players are getting 65% of gross, which
34
make it higher than that dedicated to players in the NBA.
Free agency, even if granted, will not, in my opinion, significantly
improve the lineman's salary or benefits, although the average NFL salary would rise as teams signed free agent superstars. The reason is that
the owners will continue wherever possible the quiet conspiracy to hold
down wages. They can do that easily with offensive linemen, kickers,
defensive backs, but not so easily with the quarterbacks, receivers, and
running backs. My view is that the union should deemphasize free
agency and refocus on agreement over a fixed percentage of gross revenues, especially as the NFL marches toward pay-per-view telecasts of its
games. But the genius of collective bargaining is that it changes with
each new group; it is no longer up to me and the players of the 1970s.
31. NFLPA, STAT SHEET (Winter 1988-1989).
32. Id.
33. See generally Lock supra note 1, at 359-60 (owners dominated union in 1974 negotiations
despite union's use of every possible legal and economic weapon).
34. The NFL owners, of course, have a stake in exaggerating the percentage to show they
cannot afford free agency, but union leaders generally believe that the players are getting at least
55%.
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Today's posture must reflect the change in circumstances. If the membership thinks free agency is the key issue, they should pursue it.
In a real sense, unfortunately, all of this debate may not really matter. Simply put, the NFL is too powerful for the union to gain significant
changes through negotiations in free agency or a fixed percentage of the
gross. Collective bargaining is being strangled to death because the NFL
monster got too big and too strong. They control the networks; they
control the announcers; they have most of the sports press on their side;
and more important than anything else, because they operate as a monopoly sharing everything, they have money and time on their side.
To suggest that the NFL, a monopoly that has systematically destroyed all competitors for major league football in this country 35 and
has secured two antitrust exemptions from Congress, 36 should now be
allowed to argue that their unilaterally imposed system to stop themselves from spending more money on talent should be protected under
labor's exemption to the antitrust laws even after an agreement expires, is
ridiculous. The owners seek to claim the benefit of the labor exemption
while the League is doing everything in its power to break the union, and
while they refuse to bargain in good faith for a new agreement. It is
"Boulwareism" with a vengeance. 37 It would be turning a blind eye to
reality for courts to ignore the bargaining history between this union and
this monopoly and conclude that there should be an exemption to patently illegal contracts and combinations in restraint of trade. The simple presence of a union cannot change the picture. The union cannot
effectively strike. Therefore, the union cannot make meaningful demands, let alone engage in meaningful arm's-length bargaining. An
"arm's-length, goodfaith collective bargaining agreement," the yardstick
applied by the Mackey court, is almost out of the question. If a court
were to hold that the NFL can rest easy under the labor exemption,
which comes from an "agreement" in which players accept, if not propose, certain restrictions, then courts and Congress have really done
more for football owners than the Supreme Court ever did for baseball
owners. 38 One would only hope that the name is changed to "manage35. NFL v. USFL, 644 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding NFL had monopoly power in
professional football market), aff'd, 842 F.2d 1335 (2nd Cir. 1987).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982); See Lock, supra note 1,at 402-15 (discussing NFL's antitrust
exemptions).
37. See General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 196 (1964) (celebrated case in which GE vicepresident utilized strategy of going over heads of union leaders directly to membership on "fair,
firm" offer; Board found actions not bargaining in good faith). See generally H. NORTHROP,
BOULWAREISM (1964) (discussing GeneralElectric and management strategy of merchandising offer

directly to union members and public).
38. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (reaffirming baseball's antitrust exemption).
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ment's exemption" to be invoked whenever a monopoly rolls over a
union.
What is the solution? Read Professor Ethan Lock's article and see
how Congress or the courts can solve the problems for two parties who
refuse to recognize reality, either legal or economic. The participants
who benefit from this stalemate are the superstars, agents, and owners.
The losers are the non-star players who make up about 96% of the
union. These players face real hardship: they have no job security because they can be fired at any time; they are frequently cut when they get
injured, but face delay in getting an arbitration decision; their pensions
39
are in jeopardy; and their salaries are depressed by the reserve system.
Sensible people could settle this dispute quickly, but the owners
seem caught up in the contest. They may have forgotten why they
started this game. Was it to finally get back at the union for 1982? Are
they still angry with John Mackey? Did they decide that once and for all
they would show those jocks who is in charge? Are the NFL attorneys
intent on re-trying the Mackey case? Probably all of the above, although
in my opinion none of the above justifies the risks involved in letting the
lawyers call the plays. It is time for a settlement. If none comes, it is
time for the solutions outlined by Professor Lock.

39. See, e.g., NFL Standard Player Contract

11 (rev. 1982) (players can be cut at any time).

